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INTRODUCTION 
In 2000, Utah changed its auto insurance law to protect insureds by making 
the presumptive limits for underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage the same as the 
policyholder's liability limits. The legislature required auto insurers to give their 
policyholders enough information that the policyholder could make an informed 
choice to increase his or her UIM limits to match the policy's liability limits.1 For 
new policies, the auto insurer had to get a written acknowledgment from the 
insured that it was waiving the higher coverage.2 For existing policies, the auto 
insurer had to provide the insured with certain information "with the first two 
renewal notices sent after January 1, 2001."3 In this case, Allstate did neither. 
Yet, when the Casadays, Allstate's insureds, were involved in an accident with an 
underinsured motorist, Allstate told the Casadays that they only had $10,000 per 
person in UIM coverage, not $100,000 per person, the amount of their liability 
coverage. The Casadays brought this action against Allstate claiming that its 
refusal to provide more than the statutory minimum in UIM coverage was a 
breach of contract and bad faith. 
See generally General Sec. Indent. Co. of Ariz. v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 
109,11 9 & n.4,11-15, & 23,158 P.3d 1121, cert denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 2007). 
2
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-305(9)(b) (2001). 
3
 Id. § 31A-22-305(9)(g) (2001). 
1 
Allstate relied on a narrow reading of the plaintiffs' complaint to argue 
that the plaintiffs were only claiming that their policy was a new policy, and, 
since their policy was in fact a renewal policy, the plaintiffs' claims against 
Allstate failed as a matter of law. The trial court agreed and granted Allstate's 
motion for summary judgment. 
Before bringing this action, the Casadays asked Allstate for proof that it 
had complied with the 2000 amendment to the UIM statute. Allstate does not 
dispute that it did not give the Casadays the information they requested, nor 
does it dispute that it knew the proper subsection of the UIM statute that the 
plaintiffs' claims arose under (subsection (g)) even before the Casadays filed suit, 
that it identified the proper subsection in its answer, and that it went through 
extensive discovery on whether it had complied with the requirements of 
subsection (g), all without objection. Because the "pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits," 
did not show that Allstate was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the trial 
court erred in granting Allstate's motion for summary judgment.4 And the trial 
court compounded its error when it denied the Casadays' post-judgment motion 
to alter or amend the judgment, to amend the pleadings to conform to the 
evidence, or to allow the Casadays to file an amended complaint. 
4




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ALLSTATE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
As Allstate acknowledges,5 in deciding a motion for summary judgment, 
the trial court must look beyond the pleadings: Summary judgment"shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law/ /6 Allstate focuses only on the Casadays' complaint and ignores the rest of 
the record. 
Allstate claims that each of the Casadays' claims against it was based 
"solely" on two assertions: (1) that Allstate violated section 31 A-22~305(9)(b) of 
the Utah Code, and (2) that Allstate violated "Utah law." It claims that 
subsection (b) did not apply in this case because it only applied to new policies, 
and the Casadays7 policy was not a new policy. It also claims that the allegation 
that Allstate violated "Utah law" was insufficient to give it fair notice of the 
Casadays7 claims. 
See Br. of Appellee at 10. 
UTAH R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). 
3 
Allegations in a complaint should be construed liberally.7 In fact, each of 
the Casadays' claims was based on their averments that, under Utah law, Allstate 
should have provided them with UIM limits equal to their liability limits 
($100,000 per person). (See R. 3, f 10 ("Plaintiffs should have been entitled to the 
protection of their underinsured motorist coverage issued by defendant in a 
minimum amount of $100,000 per person, up to $300,000 per occurrence."); R. 4, 
Tf 12 ("In violation of Utah law and contrary to the facts, defendant advised 
Plaintiffs that their policy of insurance only provided underinsured motorist 
coverage in the amount of $10,000"); R. 4, % 14 (Allstate "falsely represented] to 
[plaintiffs] that the limits of their underinsured motorist coverage with defendant 
was $10,000 per person"); R. 5, f 15 ("The defendant has refused to pay the limits 
of underinsured motorist coverage required by the policy and by law."). 
Whether that was because the Casadays' policy was a new policy, as alleged in 
paragraph 4 of the complaint (R. 2, f 4), and therefore subject to subsection (b) of 
the UIM statute, or an existing policy and therefore subject to subsection (g) of 
the UIM statute, as Allstate alleged in its answer (R. 25, f 6), the Casadays' claim 
was that Allstate falsely told them that their policy only provided UIM limits of 
$10,000, "[i]n violation of Utah law and contrary to the facts" (R. 4, ^ 12; see also 
R. 649:14-655:14; 663:1-665:20), that Allstate had not complied with the provisions 
7
 DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,443 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). 
4 
of the UIM statute, and that the Casadays' UIM limits should therefore have been 
equal to their liability limits. 
This conclusion is borne out by the other "pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file/' which Allstate simply ignores. As 
noted, Allstate specifically alleged in its answer that "Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
305(9)(g) (2001) specifically applies in lieu of subsection 9(b)" and that "Allstate 
fully complied with the provisions of subsection 9(g)." (R. 25, f 6.) 
In response to Allstate's request that they admit that "there is a reasonable 
basis for Allstate's contention that Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-3-5(9)(g)(2001) 
governs" their claims, the Casadays admitted that 
not only does Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22~305(9)(g)(2001) govern the 
amount of the plaintiffs7 policy limits, but that § 31A-22-
305(9)(b)(2001) may also apply, since, whenever plaintiffs added or 
deleted a vehicle from their policy of insurance, the policy may be 
considered a "new polic[y]."[8] 
(R. 464 (citations omitted).) 
8
 The distinction between new and existing policies is not always 
clear. Other courts have held that where an insured makes changes to an existing 
policy, such as by adding a new car to the policy or another insured, the policy 
may be considered a new policy for purposes of similar statutes. See, e.g., Savant 
v. American Central Ins. Co., 725 So.2d 43,47 (La. Ct. App. 1998) ("Ordinarily, 
when there are changes in the insurance policy which involve the addition of 
insureds or vehicles, the policy is a new policy which requires the execution of 
new UM forms.") (citations omitted), writ denied, 739 So.2d 202 (La. 1999). 
5 
The parties engaged in extensive discovery, including depositions of key 
Allstate emplo)/ees. Virtually all of this deposition testimony was directed at 
whether Allstate had complied with subsection (g), and Allstate did not object to 
the testimony as irrelevant or beyond the scope of the Casadays' claims. {See, e.g., 
R. 86-89, \ \ 7-17; 99; 102-05; 108-09; 111; 119-22; 127; 185-86, \ \ 2-5; 201:9-202:25; 
219-20,\ 2; 576:1-591:4; 620:16-631:17; 638:10-642:9; 696:3-700:2; see also R. 872, at 
6:18-23,11:20-22.) Instead, Allstate simply claimed that it had complied with 
subsection (g). 
Through interrogatories, the Casadays asked Allstate to identify its 
employees who allegedly sent the notices required by subsection (g) (which, by 
the time of the Casadays7 accident, had been renumbered subsection (h)) and the 
date the notices were sent. {See R. 121.) Allstate should have sent the notices 
with the Casadays' February 16 and August 16, 2001 renewal notices. (R. 87, f 
10.) Allstate produced a copy of the notice it claimed to have sent the Casadays 
on August 16,2001, but not the February 16, 2001 notice. {See R. 87-88, % 12.) 
After first claiming that a second notice did not exist {see R. 103-05) and 
after the discovery cut-off date had passed, Allstate produced for the first time a 
second notice, which it claimed to have sent the Casadays in April 2001 {see R. 88, 
113; 94-96; 99). 
6 
The Casadays then asked the court to extend the time for them to amend 
their pleadings and complete discovery (see R. 81-111,128), and Allstate moved to 
compel the plaintiffs to produce all communications between them and Allstate, 
claiming that the communications "are integral to this case because tlte claims being 
made by plaintiffs include their never liaving received notice oftlie new 2001 UIM law 
that defendant maintains it sent them.f/ (See R. 159 (emphasis added).) That notice 
was only required by subsection (g), not subsection (b). 
At the hearing on the Casadays' motion to modify the case management 
order, counsel for Allstate acknowledged that the case arose out of the change in 
the UIM law in 2001 (R. 335, at 9:18-21), that the change required a written waiver 
for new policies (R. 335, at 10:8-12), but, for renewal policies, required written 
notice to the insured in the next two renewal notices (R. 335, at 11:1-9), which was 
"this situation" (R. 335, at 11:10-11). Allstate claimed that the notice it sent in 
April 2001 satisfied its obligation under subsection (g) to send notice with the 
February 16,2001 renewal notice. Allstate told the court that that the parties 
simply interpreted the statute differently. (R. 335, at 12:10-12.) Allstate admitted 
that it should have produced in its initial disclosures the notices it claims to have 
sent under subsection (g) but was not able to find the first notice at that time. (R. 
335, at 13:12-17.) 
7 
Recognizing that, whether Allstate sent the two notices required by 
subsection (g) was "a very relevant issue" (R. 335, at 22:16-22), the trial court let 
the Casadays take two additional depositions on that issue. (R. 268.) 
Allstate now claims that it was surprised when, in response to its motion 
for summary judgment, the Casadays claimed that Allstate had not complied 
with subsection (g). Rather, it was the Casadays who were surprised when, after 
going through extensive discovery on whether Allstate had complied with 
subsection (g), even after the discovery cut-off date had passed, Allstate then 
tried to hide behind a single, solitary reference to subsection (b) in the plaintiffs' 
complaint. 
The " pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file" clearly showed that the Casadays were claiming that Allstate did not give 
them the notices required by subsection (g). Because there were genuine issues 
of material fact as to whether Allstate had complied with subsection (g),9 the trial 
court erred in granting Allstate's motion for summary judgment. 
Allstate claims that the Casadays raised the "new claim" that Allstate had 
not complied with subsection (g) "for the first time" in their memorandum in 
9
 See Br. of the Appellants at 17 (showing that there was a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Allstate ever sent the April 2001 notice to the 
Casadays, even assuming the April notice could make up for Allstate's failure to 
give the Casadays notice with their February 2001 renewal). 
8 
opposition to Allstate's motion for summary judgment. This argument ignores 
"the pleadings [including Allstate's own answer], depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions" set out above, as well as the opinions of the 
expert witnesses on both sides. (See, e.g., R. 273-304 (reports of plaintiffs' liability 
experts, who opined that Allstate had not complied with the 2001 UM/UIM law, 
including subsection (g)) & R. 564:7-10 (opinion of Allstate's expert that "of 
course" the claims were sufficiently developed that the case would be tried on 
both the theory that the policy was a new policy, requiring compliance with 
subsection (b), and that it was a renewal policy, requiring compliance with 
subsection (g)). 
Allstate notes that, under Utah's liberal pleading rules, a plaintiff "'must 
only give the defendant "fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the 
claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved,"'" but adds that 
"'it must do at least that much'" and claims that the Casadays did not even do 
that much.11 Allstate's own answer belies this claim. Allstate recognized that the 
Casadays were seeking UIM limits equal to their liability limits and alleged that 
section 31A-22-305(9)(g) "specifically applies in lieu of subsection 9(b)," and 
further alleged that "Allstate fully complied with the provisions of subsection 
See, e.g., Br. of Appellee at 12-13,14. 




9(g)/' (R. 25, f 6.) In response to the Casadays' allegation that Allstate had 
advised them, /y[i]n violation of Utah law and contrary to the facts," that their 
UIM coverage was only $10,000 (see R. 4,112), Allstate admitted that it had so 
advised the Casadays but claimed that its advice was true, "as established by 
their coverage elections and through compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
305(9)(g) (2001)" (R. 26,112). Allstate further alleged that "Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-22-305(9)(g) (2001) directly governs the Underinsured Motorist coverage 
limits of plaintiffs' automobile policy with Allstate." (R. 28,4th defense.) 
Although Allstate erroneously characterized this as an affirmative defense,12 once 
it did the Casadays were entitled to assert any argument available to them.13 
Asael Farr & Sons14 and the other cases Allstate relies on for its position,15 
are distinguishable. Farr arose out of an ice-cream maker's efforts to insure its 
operations. Farr was working with several brokers or agents to place new 
coverage before its existing policy expired but was not able to do so. The day it 
submitted a new application but before the policy was issued, it suffered a loss. 
12
 See infra pp. 22-23. 
13
 E.g., City of Palmer v. Anderson, 603 P.2d 495,498 (Alaska 1979). 
14
 Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 2008 UT App 315,193 P.3d 
650, cert denied, 205 P.3d 103 (Utah 2009). 
15
 Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,48 P.3d 895, and Harper v. 
Evans, 2008 UT App 165,185 P.3d 573, cert, denied, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah 2008). 
10 
It sued the agents and insurers it had been working with for, among other things, 
breach of contract. The alleged contract was a commitment by one of the agents 
to determine all of Farr's insurable risks, advise Farr of available coverages, and 
ensure that Farr was covered for all the risks.16 The complaint did not allege that 
the defendants had actually bound coverage and refused to pay.17 In response to 
the defendants' motions for summary judgment, Farr alleged, for the first time, 
that one of the insurers had orally bound coverage before the loss. The court 
held that Farr's breach-of-contract claim was not broad enough to cover this 
claim. It reasoned that the "premise" of Farr's claims as pleaded was that Farr 
was not adequately insured for the losses it suffered and that the defendants 
breached some duty to Farr to ensure that it was adequately covered.18 Farr's 
new theory that insurance for the loss had been orally bound before the loss, was 
"directly contrary" to its theory that it was not adequately covered for the loss.19 
Since there was "nothing in the complaint to suggest that Farr intended to assert 
the existence of adequate coverage as an alternative theory,"20 the court 
See 2008 UT App 315, f 15. 
Id. If 18. 
Id. 117. 








concluded that the complaint did not give the defendants adequate notice of the 
oral binder theory. 
Similarly, in Holmes the court held that a breach-of-contract claim against a 
title insurer for breach of the insurance policy did not properly raise a claim for 
breach of contractual duties arising outside of the policy. And in Harper the court 
held that a medical malpractice claim arising out of allegedly negligent surgery 
did not include a claim for continuing negligent treatment in follow-up care. 
By contrast, in this case all the Casadays' claims were based on their theory 
that their UIM limits should have been the same as their liability limits. The 
Casadays' claimed they did not have adequate UIM coverage because Allstate 
did not comply with the UIM statute. Their theory that Allstate did not comply 
with subsection (g) was subsumed within that theory and entirely consistent with 
their claims. That theory was at issue no later than when Allstate filed its answer 
asserting that subsection (g), rather than subsection (b), applied. Moreover, the 
theory was fully discovered during the course of discovery. In fact, whether 
Allstate complied with its obligations under subsection (g) was the main issue in 
discovery. Thus, this case is not like Fan, Holmes, or Harper, where the plaintiffs' 
12 
new theories were never raised until the plaintiffs filed their memoranda in 
opposition to the defendants' motions for summary judgment.21 
Allstate argues that this court in Farr looked solely to the complaint to see 
if a claim was raised and "made no attempt to determine whether discovery had 
occurred on that particular claim or whether the opposing party had some other 
'notice' and opportunity to defend."22 The court in Farr did not have to look 
beyond the complaint because, unlike here, Farr never argued that its alternative, 
21
 See Holmes Dev., 2002 UT 38, f 31 ("This claim was originally raised 
in Holmes's memorandum in opposition to First American's motion to 
dismiss/for summary judgment, and was not raised in the complaint."); Farr, 
2008 UT App 315, % 19 ("Farr's oral binder claim was first raised, after 
approximately three years of discovery, in Farr's memorandum in opposition to 
Hartford's motion for summary judgment.") (footnote omitted); Harper, 2008 UT 
App 165, % 14 ("we cannot rely on the allegations of a negligent course of 
treatment raised for the first time in the Harpers' opposition to summary 
judgment"). See also Br. of Appellee First American Title Ins. Co. at 18, Holmes 
Dev., 2002 UT 38 (No. 20000745-SC) ("Significantly, Holmes did not present the -
trial court with an affidavit or any other proof that First American had 
undertaken or breached any additional duties to Holmes."); Br. of Appellees 
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. & American States Ins. Co. at 16, n.4, Farr, 2008 UT App 
315 (No. 20070518-CA) ("it was not until after the discovery had been done and 
motions for summary judgment were filed that Van, for tlie first time, raised the 
argument . . . about an oral insurance binder") (emphasis in original); Br. of 
Appellants at 12 & 14, Harper, 2008 UT App 165 (No. 20060984-CA) 
(acknowledging that the plaintiffs' theory of the case was set out in the affidavit 
of their expert, which was first filed as part of their memorandum in opposition 
to the defendants' motion for summary judgment). 
22
 Br. of Appellees at 16. 
13 
"oral binder" theory was ever raised or at issue before the defendants filed their 
motions for summary judgment. 
Allstate argues that, if the court were to accept the Casadays' argument, it 
could be potentially liable for higher UIM limits on a multitude of theories, 
including equitable estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, reformation, or 
detrimental reliance.23 Apart from the fact that fraud must be pleaded with 
particularity,24 none of those theories were raised by the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or admissions. Allstate's failure to comply with 
subsection (g) was. 
Allstate also argues that it would be prejudiced if the court were to set 
aside the summary judgment because it would have to file an answer to an 
amended complaint, re-open discovery, and conduct "extensive discovery on the 
new issue." In fact, the issue of Allstate's compliance with subsection (g) has 
already been extensively discovered. (See, e.g., R. 86-89, 1^f 7-17; 99; 102-05; 108-
09; 111; 119-22; 127; 185-86, ^ 1 2-5; 201:9-202:25; 219-20, f 2; R. 872, at 6:18-23, 
11:20-22.) Allstate has not identified any additional discovery that would be 
required. 
Id. at 15. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
14 
Because "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file,/ did not show that Allstate was entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law, the court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment. 
II. 
THE COURT SHOULD GIVE EFFECT TO RULE 4(c) AND REACH 
THE MERITS OF THE CAS AD AYS' POST-JUDGMENT MOTION. 
The parties have previously briefed Allstate's argument that this court 
lacks jurisdiction to review the trial court's denial of the Casadays' post-
judgment motion to alter or amend the judgment, to amend the pleadings to 
conform to the evidence, or to grant plaintiffs leave to amend.25 The Casadays 
will not repeat their arguments on that issue here, other than to note that they 
argued previously that the court should resolve the conflict between Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(2) and 4(c) by construing rule 4(b)(2) to apply to a 
notice of appeal that is filed while a post-judgment motion is pending. Allstate 
claims that this argument is illogical and "begs the questions as to why any party 
would ever file a notice of appeal of a post-judgment motion before a trial court 
See Mot. for Summ. Disposition; Mem. of P&A in Supp. of Mot. for 
Summ. Disposition; Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. Disposition (incorporated 
herein by reference); & Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. Disposition. 
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even rules on the motion/726 The notice of appeal in that situation would not be 
of the post-judgment motion but of the underlying judgment, which an appellant 
may file out of an abundance of caution (for example, because he is not sure that 
his post-judgment motion will be deemed a proper motion extending the time to 
appeal). Rule 4(b)(2) requires a new notice of appeal from the denial of the post-
judgment motion in that situation. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE CASADAYS' MOTION 
TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT. 
Allstate argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
the Casadays' rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment because the 
Casadays raised a "new" argument in that motion, namely, that they mistakenly 
alleged the wrong statute in their complaint. As shown in point I, supra, the 
Casadays did not raise a "new" argument. The argument that Allstate failed to 
comply with subsection (g) has been part of this case at least since Allstate 
answered the Casadays7 complaint. Rather, the Casadays merely pointed out the 
law that a citation to the wrong statutory provision does not make a complaint 
defective; as long as a complaint puts the defendant on notice of a valid claim so 
Br. of Appellant at 24. 
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that the defendant is not prejudiced by the erroneous citation and it is apparent 
from the complaint that the claim would be actionable under the correct statute, 
the complaint raises a good claim. (See R. 731-32 & cases cited therein.) 
Allstate claims that two of the cases the Casadays cited—Huss v. Green 
Spring Health Sew., Inc.,27 and Roman v. City ofMiddletown Board of Education28— 
support its position that it did not have adequate notice of the Casadays' claim. 
It quotes the following language from Huss: "[a] reference to the wrong statute 
. . . will be corrected by the court if it can determine the appropriate statute . . . 
from the complaint/'29 and argues that the trial court could not have determined 
from the Casadays' complaint that they intended subsection (g) as another basis 
for recovery. Huss, however, involved a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), under which the court '"looks only to the facts alleged 
in the complaint and its attachments without reference to other parts of the 
record.'"30 This case involves a motion for summary judgment, under rule 56, 
which requires the court to consider all the pleadings, as well as the depositions, 
27
 18 F. Supp. 2d 400 (D. Del. 1998). 
28
 No. CV065000318S, 2007 WL 866480 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 7,2007). 
29
 Br. of Appellee at 29 (quoting Hussf 18 F. Supp. 2d at 403, which in 
turn was quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1210, at 121). 
30
 See 18 R Supp. 2d at 401-02 (citations omitted). 
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answers to interrogatories, and admissions. From those materials, it was clear 
that the Casadays were seeking relief under subsections (b) and (g), depending 
on whether their policy was ultimately determined to be a new or existing policy. 
Allstate also tries to distinguish Roman on the grounds that the complaint 
in that case pleaded facts that stated a cause of action under the correct statute, 
whereas, it claims, the Casadays' complaint does not. The Casadays7 complaint, 
however, alleges that their auto policy provided liability coverage of $100,000 per 
person, that they never elected less UIM coverage, that they should have been 
entitled to UIM coverage in a minimum amount of $100,000 per person, that, in 
violation of Utah law and contrary to the facts, Allstate advised them that their 
policy only provided UIM coverage of $10,000 per person, and that Allstate has 
refused to pay them the limits of UIM coverage required by the policy and by 
law. (R. 2-5, f Tf 5, 8,10,12,15-16.) These facts state a claim under subsection 
(g) .3 1 
Allstate claims that the trial court granted its motion for summary 
judgment not because the Casadays' complaint referred to the wrong statute 
31
 Cf. Lopez v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 2009 UT App 389, tlf 11-21, — R3d 
— (allegations that an insurer did not comply with subsection (b) entitled the 
plaintiff to judgment on her contract claim, even though she was not a party to 
the contract). 
18 
(subsection (b)) but because it did not cite the right statute (subsection (g)). But 
the Casadays were not required to cite to any statute in their complaint.33 If the 
allegations of paragraphs 4 (that the policy was issued after January 1, 2001) and 
6 (referring to subsection (b)) were omitted, their complaint would have been 
sufficient to state a claim under subsection (g). In any event, Allstate was on 
notice from the beginning—even before the Casadays7 filed their complaint—that 
it had to comply with subsection (g) and could be liable if it did not. (See R. 
578:3-20; 583:3-9; 335, at 14:19-25.) In fact, it granted relief to others in the 
Casadays' position even though they did not file suit. (See R. 698:6-700:2; 628A:5-
629:13.) 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE CONFORMED THE PLEADINGS 
TO THE EVIDENCE. 
Allstate argues that rule 15(b), which requires that issues "not raised by the 
pleading [that] are tried by express or implied consent of the parties . . . be 
32
 See Br. of Appellee at 30-31. 
33
 See, e.g., Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152,1157 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Notice 
pleading requires the plaintiff to set forth in his complaint claims for relief, not 
causes of action, statutes or legal theories.") (citations omitted); Erickson v. 
Hunter, 932 F. Supp. 1380,1384 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (it is not necessary for the 
plaintiff to cite statutory authority in the complaint). 
19 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings/' does not apply 
to summary judgment proceedings. It acknowledges that there is no controlling 
Utah law on point but claims that Eldridge v. FamsworthM and the cases it cites 
support its position. But Eldridge did not reach the issue, and most of the Utah 
cases it cited were appeals after a trial, so the issue never arose.35 In the only 
other Utah case cited, the court relied on rule 15(b) to affirm a summary 
judgment on a claim that was not included in the complaint, noting that the 
record supported the claim.36 Thus, if anything, Utah law supports the 
application of rule 15(b) to summary judgments. 
Allstate also claims the Casadays' rule 15(b) motion was untimely. But 
rule 15(b) expressly says that a motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence 
"may be made . . . at any time, even after judgment/7 That was the case here. 
Atcitty v. Board of Education?7 the case Allstate relies on for its untimeliness 
argument, involved a motion to amend under rule 15(a), not rule 15(b).38 
34
 2007 UT App 243,166 P.3d 639, cert denied, 186 P.3d 347 (Utah 2007). 
35
 See Eldridge, 2007 UT App 243, f 35; Keller v. Southwood N. Med. 
Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102,103-05 (Utah 1998); England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 
341-42 (Utah 1997); Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409,411-12 (Utah 1998). 
36
 Hallstrom v. Buhler, 14 Utah 2d 111, 378 P.2d 355,357-58 (1963). 
37
 Atcitty v. Board ofEduc. of San Juan County Sch. Dist., 967 P.2d 1261 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). 
38
 See zd. at 1264. 
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Allstate argues that the trial court did not err in denying the Casadays 
leave to amend because the trial court could not grant relief under rule 15 
without first granting relief under rule 59(e).39 Even assuming this rule applies to 
motions to amend under rule 15(b), which expressly authorizes motions to be 
filed after judgment, and not just to rule 15(a),40 the Casadays brought their 
motions to amend as part of their rule 59(e) motion and asked for relief under 
both rules. (See R. 765-66.) 
Finally, Allstate claims that it never expressly or impliedly consented to try 
the issue of its compliance with subsection (g). Allstate bases this argument on 
its theory that the Casadays first raised the issue in response to Allstate's motion 
for summary judgment, and that Allstate therefore objected to it at the first 
opportunity because it objected to the plaintiffs theory in its reply 
memorandum. In fact, the record shows that Allstate raised the issue in its 
answer and in its requests for admissions; it produced documents related to the 
issue; and it allowed its employees and expert to testify at length on the issue—all 
without objection and all before Allstate ever filed its motion for summary 
Br. of Appellee at 34-35 (citing National Advertising Co. v. Murray City 
Corp., 2006 UT App 75, % 13,131 R3d 872, cert, denied, 138 P.3d 589 (Utah 2006)). 
40
 Cf.6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1489 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the no-amendment-after-judgment 
rule in connection with rule 15(a)). 
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judgment.41 Eldridge, the case Allstate relies on, is distinguishable because in that 
case, the defendant "clearly objected to the . . . introduction of new claims 
whenever they arose/'42 Allstate never objected when the issue came up 
repeatedly throughout the pretrial proceedings. The bulk of discovery was 
directed to Allstate's alleged compliance with subsection (g), and Allstate never 
objected that it was beyond the scope of the Casadays' claims. 
Allstate seeks to excuse its implicit consent to try the subsection (g) issue 
by saying that, because it raised subsection (g) as an affirmative defense, it could 
not object to the Casadays conducting discovery on that issue. But Allstate s 
claim that the Casadays' claim for additional UIM benefits was governed by 
subsection (g) rather than subsection (b) was not an affirmative defense. An 
affirmative defense is a "defendant's assertion of facts and arguments that, if 
true, will defeat the plaintiffs . . . claim, even if all tlie allegations in tlte complaint are 
true.//43 If, as Allstate claims, the complaint alleges that the Casadays' policy was 
a new policy subject to subsection (b), Allstate's claim that the policy was an 
existing policy subject to subsection (g) would not defeat the Casadays' claim if 
41
 See supra pt. I. 
42
 Eldridge, 2007 UT App 243, % 38. 
43
 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 482 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). See 
also Prince v. Bear River Mut Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, % 31, 56 P.3d 524 (an affirmative 
defense "is a defense employed to defeat the plaintiff's claim by raising matters 
outside or extrinsic to the plaintiff's prima facie case") (citations omitted). 
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their allegations were true. Because Allstate's claim "directly assail[ed] or 
'merely controverted] [the] plaintiffs prima facie case/" it was not an 
affirmative defense but simply a denial of the Casadays' allegations.44 Allstate 
could have opposed the Casadays' discovery regarding subsection (g) and 
simply chose not to. Therefore, it at least implicitly consented to try the issue. 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE 
CASADAYS TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT. 
The Casadays have previously addressed Allstate's arguments regarding 
the timeliness of, justification for, and prejudice of an amendment.45 Allstate's 
claim of prejudice fails because even if the amendment "'would advance a new 
theory of recovery/" where that theory is "'based almost entirely on facts already 
in evidence, the court should liberally allow amendment because the opposing 
party is then generally prepared to address such a claim/"46 
Allstate argues that, even if this court allows amendment of the judgment 
under rule 59(e), it would have to remand the case to the trial court to determine 
44
 See Prince, 2002 UT 68, % 31. 
45
 See Br. of Appellants at 44-48. 
46
 Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, \ 34, 87 R3d 734 
(quoting Aurora Credit Sews. v. liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273,1282 (Utah 
1998)). 
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whether amendment under rule 15(a) or 15(b) is appropriate. If this court finds, 
however, that amendment is appropriate, it can reverse and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with the Casadays' proposed amended complaint, 
particularly where, as here, the parties have briefed on appeal the propriety of 
amendment.47 
Finally, Allstate accuses the Casadays of "starting] with the conclusion-
bad faith—then work[ing] backwards to find theories or facts to support it"48 The 
Casadays started with the fact that Allstate told them they only had $10,000 in 
UIM coverage, despite their liability limits of $100,000. They asked Allstate to 
show them that it had complied with the provisions of Utah's UIM statute. 
Allstate could not do so because it neither obtained a written acknowledgment 
under subsection (b) nor did it send notices with the Casadays7 first two renewals 
under subsection (g). Allstate tries to avoid the conclusion of bad faith by hiding 
behind a hypertechnical reading of the complaint and its own failure to produce 
a critical document until after the time for amending the pleadings had passed. 
The court should not countenance these efforts. 
47
 See id. f 48. See also, e.g., Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners 
Ass'n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC.f — P.3d — , \ \ 77-78, 2009 UT 65; 
Hancock v. True & Living Church of Jesus Christ oftlte Last Days, 2005 UT App 314, f 
20,118 P.3d 297; Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, % 37, 53 P.3d 2, cert, denied, 59 
P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). 
48
 See Br. of Appellee at 41. 
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CONCLUSION 
The court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this 
case so that it can be decided on its merits. 
DATED this day of 28th day of December, 2009. 
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